

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. OF 2026.

(UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA)

(IN THE MATTER OF A PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION)

IN THE MATTER OF:

RAJ SINGH

.... PETITIONER

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

...RESPONDENTS

Paper Book

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(PLEASE SEE INSIDE)**

ADVOCATE FOR THE PETITIONER: RAJA CHOUDHARY

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Filed on: 28.07.2026

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New Delhi

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NOTICE OF MOTION

TAKE NOTICE that the accompanying Petition will be listed before Court on
_____ 2026 at 10:30 O' Clock in the forenoon or soon thereafter as may
be convenient to the Court.



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URGENT APPLICATION

To,

The Registrar,

Delhi High Court,

New Delhi

Sir,

Kindly treat the accompanying petition as urgent in accordance with the provisions of the Delhi High Court Rules.

The grounds of urgency are as per prayed.



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COURT FEE

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

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UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

...RESPONDENTS

Memo of Parties

RAJ SINGH

S/O

Umashanker Singh

R/O

869, Nawali, Ghazipur, UP- 232333

.....PETITIONER

Versus

1. UNION OF INDIA

Through the Secretary,
Ministry of Home Affairs,
North Block,

Central Secretariat,
New Delhi – 110001.

...RESPONDENT NO. 1

2. UNION OF INDIA

Through the Secretary,
Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs,
92, Parliament House,
Parliament Street,
New Delhi – 110001.

...RESPONDENT NO. 2

3. LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT

Through the Secretary-General,
Parliament House,
Parliament Street,
New Delhi – 110001.

...RESPONDENT NO. 3

4. RAJYA SABHA SECRETARIAT

Through the Secretary-General,
Parliament House,
Parliament Street,
New Delhi – 110001..

...RESPONDENT NO. 4

FILED THROUGH COUNSEL:

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Filed on: 28.07.2026
New Delhi

SYNOPSIS

The present Public Interest Litigation concerns the institutional safety, security, resilience and uninterrupted constitutional functioning of the Parliament of India, one of the foremost constitutional institutions established under the Constitution of India.

The petition arises in the backdrop of the evolving nature of security threats confronting democratic legislatures. While traditional concerns primarily related to terrorism and physical attacks, contemporary threats include cyber intrusions, artificial intelligence-enabled misinformation, insider vulnerabilities, drone technologies and coordinated attacks upon institutional legitimacy, necessitating periodic review of the existing institutional framework governing parliamentary security.

India's experience, including the terrorist attack on Parliament on 13 December 2001 and the security breach within the Lok Sabha on 13 December 2023, highlights the need for continuous institutional assessment and adaptation of parliamentary security arrangements. Recent calls for large-scale mobilisations towards Parliament further underscore the importance of maintaining a security framework capable of safeguarding Parliament while preserving constitutionally protected democratic freedoms.

The Petitioner has prepared a comprehensive Concept Note titled "Proposed Outline of the Parliament of India (Security, Sanctity and Protection) Act, 2026", analysing the existing institutional framework, comparative international practices and emerging security challenges. The Concept Note is annexed with the present petition for consideration by the competent authorities.

The present petition does not seek any direction compelling Parliament to enact legislation or adopt any particular policy. The limited relief sought is a direction to the Respondents to undertake a comprehensive review of the existing institutional framework governing the security of the Parliament of India, examine the accompanying Concept Note, and take a reasoned decision regarding appropriate administrative, institutional or legislative measures in accordance with law.

LIST OF DATES AND EVENTS

Date	Particulars
26.01.1950	The Constitution of India came into force, establishing Parliament as the supreme legislative institution of the Union and the constitutional forum through which representative democracy is exercised.
13.12.2001	Five terrorists belonging to Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba launched a coordinated terrorist attack on the Parliament House Complex during a live session of Parliament. Nine security and support personnel lost their lives while several others sustained injuries. The attack demonstrated that Parliament is not merely a physical structure but a symbolic target aimed at destabilising constitutional governance
2002	Parliament enacted the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002. Administrative measures including strengthened access control, enhanced coordination between Delhi Police, CRPF and intelligence agencies were introduced. However, no dedicated statutory framework governing Parliament security was enacted.
2008	The National Investigation Agency was established and intelligence-sharing mechanisms were strengthened through the multi-Agency Centre. These reforms addressed counter-terrorism generally but did not create a comprehensive statutory architecture specifically governing Parliament security.
2014-2025	Several constitutional democracies including Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Brazil undertook legislative or institutional reforms to strengthen parliamentary

	security following significant security incidents affecting their legislatures demonstrating an international trend towards integrated and periodically reviewed parliamentary security frameworks.
13.12. 2023	On the twenty-second anniversary of the 2001 attack, two individuals entered the Lok Sabha chamber from the visitors' gallery during Zero Hour and released coloured smoke canisters while others created a similar disturbance outside Parliament. The incident exposed vulnerabilities in the visitor access system despite strengthened perimeter security
December 2023 – 2024	The Union Government constituted a committee headed by the Director General, CRPF to review Parliament security. Subsequently, the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) was inducted for security of the Parliament Complex in phases. While operational measures were strengthened, these developments remained executive responses without a comprehensive statutory framework
2024–2026	Rapid technological developments including artificial intelligence-enabled misinformation, deepfakes, cyber intrusions, ransomware attacks, drone technologies, insider threats and coordinated digital interference have fundamentally transformed the threat landscape confronting democratic legislatures worldwide
Various occasions in recent years	Democratic mobilisations across the country have repeatedly culminated in calls to march towards Parliament ("Sansad Chalo"), reflecting Parliament's centrality in India's

	constitutional democracy. While peaceful protest remains constitutionally protected, large gatherings in the vicinity of Parliament require an institutional framework capable of balancing democratic freedoms with security imperatives
2026	The Petitioner undertook an extensive study of the existing legal and institutional framework governing Parliament security, emerging security threats and comparative international practices. Pursuant thereto, the Petitioner prepared a comprehensive Concept Note titled <i>"Proposed Outline of the Parliament of India (Security, Sanctity and Protection) Act, 2026"</i> identifying existing institutional gaps and proposing a comprehensive framework for review and reform
Present	Finding that the issues raised involve significant questions concerning the security, resilience and uninterrupted constitutional functioning of the Parliament of India, and that no comprehensive review of the existing security architecture has been undertaken through an integrated institutional framework, the Petitioner has approached this Hon'ble Court by way of the present Public Interest Litigation.

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**DECISION REGARDING APPROPRIATE ADMINISTRATIVE,
INSTITUTIONAL OR LEGISLATIVE MEASURES, IN ACCORDANCE
WITH LAW, WITHIN A TIME-BOUND PERIOD.**

TO

THE HON'BLE CHIEF JUSTICE

AND THE COMPANION JUDGES

OF THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

THE HUMBLE PETITION

OF THE PETITIONER ABOVE NAMED

MOST RESPECTFULLY SHOWETH:

**THE PETITIONER RESPECTFULLY SUBMITS THE FOLLOWING
FACTS FOR THE KIND CONSIDERATION OF THIS HON'BLE COURT:**

1. That the Petitioner, is a public policy advocate who has worked with United Nations Climate Change Office (Germany) and is an alumnus of the Master's Programme in International Studies and Diplomacy at SOAS University of London. The Petitioner has been actively engaged in matters relating to public policy, constitutional governance and institutional reform. The present Public Interest Litigation is being preferred in a bona fide manner and in the larger

public interest, with the objective of seeking an institutional review of the existing security framework governing the Parliament of India in light of evolving security challenges and the constitutional imperative of ensuring the security, sanctity, resilience and uninterrupted functioning of Parliament.

2. That the present Public Interest Litigation concerns the institutional safety, security, resilience and uninterrupted constitutional functioning of the Parliament of India. Parliament occupies a unique constitutional position as the supreme legislative institution of the Union through which the sovereign will of the people finds expression. Its uninterrupted functioning is indispensable for democratic governance, legislative deliberation, executive accountability, financial control and the preservation of constitutional continuity. The Petitioner submits that safeguarding Parliament is not merely a matter of protecting a physical structure but of preserving one of the foundational institutions of India's constitutional democracy
3. That the nature of threats confronting democratic institutions has undergone a significant transformation over the last two decades. While traditional security concerns primarily related to terrorism and physical intrusion, democratic legislatures today are increasingly exposed to hybrid threats including cyber intrusions, artificial intelligence-enabled misinformation, drone technologies, insider vulnerabilities, coordinated digital interference and attacks upon

institutional legitimacy. Consequently, the concept of parliamentary security has expanded beyond conventional perimeter protection and now requires an integrated institutional approach encompassing physical, technological, cyber and organisational preparedness.

4. That India's own constitutional experience demonstrates the necessity of continuously reviewing institutional preparedness. On **13 December 2001**, the Parliament of India was subjected to a coordinated terrorist attack intended not merely to inflict casualties but to strike at the constitutional foundations of the Republic by targeting the institution representing the sovereign will of the people. The incident led to significant administrative and operational improvements in Parliament security. However, despite these reforms, no comprehensive statutory framework governing the institutional architecture of Parliament security was established.
5. That more than two decades later, on **13 December 2023**, the Parliament Complex again witnessed a serious security breach when individuals gained access to the Lok Sabha Chamber through the visitors' gallery during a sitting of the House. Unlike the 2001 attack, the incident arose from procedural vulnerabilities relating to visitor access and authorised entry rather than an armed terrorist assault. The incident highlighted that contemporary risks may arise from institutional and procedural deficiencies as much as from external

attacks and underscored the need for continuous review and modernisation of Parliament's security architecture.

6. That the Petitioner respectfully submits that the importance of reviewing Parliament's security framework has assumed greater significance in recent years owing to the increasing frequency of large public mobilisations and demonstrations directed towards Parliament as the principal symbol of representative democracy. Calls for citizens to assemble or march towards Parliament ("Sansad Chalo") have become a recurring feature of democratic mobilisation across a range of public issues. While peaceful assembly and freedom of expression remain constitutionally protected, such developments also underline the necessity of ensuring that the existing security framework remains capable of simultaneously safeguarding democratic participation and protecting the institutional integrity and uninterrupted functioning of Parliament. A copy of social media posts and newspaper clipping covering the recent 'Chalo Sansad' call for 20.07.2026 have been attached herewith and marked as **ANNEXURE P-1 (Pg No. 30-31)**
7. That comparative developments across several constitutional democracies further demonstrate that legislative institutions are increasingly recognised as critical constitutional infrastructure requiring specialised security frameworks. Following significant security incidents, jurisdictions including

Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and others have undertaken institutional reviews, restructured command mechanisms, strengthened visitor management systems, enhanced cyber resilience and adopted integrated security measures to respond to evolving threats. These developments illustrate an international recognition that parliamentary security requires periodic institutional review and continuous adaptation.

8. That although India has undertaken several administrative reforms following major security incidents, including improvements in access control, technological systems and deployment of specialised security personnel, the existing framework continues to function substantially through executive and administrative arrangements. The Petitioner submits that the rapidly evolving threat environment necessitates a comprehensive review of the existing institutional framework so as to assess its adequacy in addressing present and future security challenges
9. That in view of the foregoing constitutional, institutional and technological developments, the Petitioner undertook an extensive study of the existing legal, institutional and operational framework governing the security of the Parliament of India. Pursuant thereto, the Petitioner prepared a comprehensive policy document titled **"Proposed Outline of the Parliament of India (Security, Sanctity and Protection) Act, 2026"**, which analyses the existing

security architecture, comparative international practices, emerging security threats and possible institutional measures for strengthening the security, sanctity and uninterrupted constitutional functioning of Parliament.

A copy of the concept note researched and drafted by the petitioner, titled **"Proposed Outline of the Parliament of India (Security, Sanctity and Protection) Act, 2026** is attached herewith and marked as **ANNEXURE P-2 (Pg No. 32-49)**

10. That the Petitioner respectfully submits that the aforesaid Concept Note is intended solely as a policy proposal for consideration by the competent authorities. It neither seeks to substitute the wisdom of the executive nor proposes that this Hon'ble Court direct Parliament to enact any legislation. The Petitioner seeks only that the issues identified therein, together with the recommendations made, be examined by the competent authorities through an appropriate institutional review in accordance with law
11. That despite the constitutional significance of the issues involved and the evolving nature of threats confronting democratic institutions, there is presently no indication that a comprehensive review of the existing institutional framework governing the security of the Parliament of India has been undertaken in light of the concerns identified in the accompanying Concept Note. In these circumstances, the Petitioner is constrained to invoke

the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking appropriate directions to the Respondents to examine the Concept Note annexed with the present petition, undertake a comprehensive review of the existing institutional framework governing parliamentary security, and take a reasoned decision regarding such administrative, institutional or legislative measures as may be considered appropriate in accordance with law

QUESTIONS OF LAW

The following substantial questions of constitutional and public law arise for consideration by this Hon'ble Court:

- A. Whether the safety, security, resilience and uninterrupted constitutional functioning of the Parliament of India constitute matters of public importance and constitutional governance warranting periodic review by the competent executive authorities?
- B. Whether the Respondents, being entrusted with the administration, protection and security of the Parliament of India, are under a public law obligation to periodically assess and review the adequacy of the existing institutional framework governing parliamentary security in light of evolving physical, technological, cyber and institutional threats?

- C. Whether the failure to undertake a comprehensive review of the existing institutional framework governing the security of the Parliament of India, despite significant developments in the nature of contemporary security threats and vulnerabilities, is amenable to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India?
- D. Whether this Hon'ble Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, may issue appropriate directions requiring the competent authorities to examine the Petitioner's Concept Note and take a reasoned decision thereon without trenching upon the legislative domain or violating the constitutional principle of separation of powers?
- E. Whether constitutional governance requires the Executive to consider, in a fair, objective and time-bound manner, bona fide public policy proposals concerning the protection and institutional resilience of the Parliament of India?
- F. Whether comparative constitutional practices relating to parliamentary security may legitimately be taken into consideration by the competent authorities while evaluating reforms suited to India's constitutional and institutional framework?

GROUND

- A. Because Parliament occupies a unique constitutional position within the constitutional framework of India. Its uninterrupted functioning is essential for preserving representative democracy, constitutional governance and the rule of law. Any institutional review concerning its security is therefore a matter of legitimate constitutional concern.
- B. Because the contemporary security environment has fundamentally evolved. The nature of threats confronting democratic institutions has expanded from conventional physical attacks to hybrid threats, cyber intrusions, artificial intelligence-enabled misinformation, insider vulnerabilities, technological sabotage and coordinated attacks upon institutional legitimacy. Such developments necessitate periodic institutional assessment to ensure that existing security arrangements remain adequate and responsive.
- C. Because India's own institutional experience demonstrates the necessity of continuous review. The terrorist attack upon Parliament in 2001 and the security breach within the Lok Sabha in 2023 revealed different categories of institutional vulnerability and illustrate that security challenges evolve over time. These developments justify a comprehensive review of the existing institutional framework governing parliamentary security.

- D. Because constitutional governance requires an appropriate balance between democratic freedoms and institutional security. The protection of Parliament and the preservation of democratic freedoms are complementary constitutional objectives. Measures intended to strengthen institutional security must simultaneously respect the freedoms guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution while ensuring that Parliament remains capable of functioning freely, independently and without disruption.
- E. Because periodic institutional review is an essential component of good governance. The Respondents are entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring the safety and security of one of the Republic's foremost constitutional institutions. Good governance requires that institutional arrangements be periodically evaluated in light of changing circumstances, technological developments and emerging risks so that necessary administrative, institutional or legal reforms may be considered wherever appropriate.
- F. Because comparative constitutional experience provides valuable guidance. Several constitutional democracies have undertaken institutional reviews and reforms of parliamentary security following significant security incidents. While such comparative experiences are not binding, they constitute relevant material which may legitimately assist the competent authorities in evaluating reforms appropriate to Indian conditions.

G. Because the relief sought is limited, reasonable and consistent with the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. The Petitioner does not seek any direction compelling Parliament to enact legislation, adopt any particular policy or accept the recommendations contained in the Concept Note. The limited relief sought is a direction requiring the Respondents to examine the Concept Note, undertake a comprehensive review of the existing institutional framework governing the security of the Parliament of India, and take a reasoned decision regarding such administrative, institutional or legislative measures as they may consider appropriate in accordance with law.

H. Because the Petitioner has approached this Hon'ble Court bona fide and in the larger public interest. The Petition is motivated solely by considerations of constitutional governance and institutional resilience. The Petitioner has no personal, political or pecuniary interest in the outcome of the present proceedings. The accompanying Concept Note has been prepared after extensive study and is placed before this Hon'ble Court only to facilitate informed consideration by the competent authorities.

PRAYER

In view of the facts and circumstances stated hereinabove, it is most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may graciously be pleased to:

- a. Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction, including a writ of Mandamus, directing the Respondents to undertake a comprehensive review of the existing institutional framework governing the safety, security, resilience and uninterrupted constitutional functioning of the Parliament of India, including its administrative, institutional, operational, technological and cyber-security mechanisms, in light of evolving security challenges and emerging threats;
- b. Direct the Respondents, while undertaking such review, to examine and consider the Concept Note titled "Proposed Outline of the Parliament of India (Security, Sanctity and Protection) Act, 2026", annexed with the present Petition, along with such other material as the competent authorities may deem appropriate, and take a reasoned decision regarding the necessity or otherwise of adopting appropriate administrative, institutional and/or legislative measures;
- c. Direct the Respondents to complete the aforesaid exercise within such time as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and communicate the outcome thereof by way of an appropriate decision/status report before this Hon'ble Court;

d. Pass such other and further order(s) or direction(s) as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case and in the interests of justice.

AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS THE PETITIONER SHALL, AS IN DUTY BOUND, EVER PRAY

DRAWN AND FILED BY:



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Advocate for the Petitioner

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Filed on: 28.07.2026

New Delhi

AFFIDAVIT

ANNEXURE P-1

abhijeetdipke and cockroachjantaparty

abhijeetdipke Jai Samvidhan!!!
1 w

amit20_prajapati
1 w 14 likes Reply

rasnabhasin
1 w Reply

anshul.verma007 full support jai bhim
1 w 448 likes Reply See Translation
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_mansii_j_ All the best dada..
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Harshit Mahawar

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CJP's 'Sansad Chalo': What to expect on Monday as protesters set for Parliament march, police say no permission

The convergence of the CJP protest with the opening day of Parliament has heightened security across the national capital.

Updated on: Jul 19, 2026, 21:38:00 IST

Edited by [Anagha Deshpande](#)



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India

What happened during CJP's 'Chalo Sansad': Top 10 developments, as they unfolded

A rainy night presaged one of the largest protests in the Capital as protesters poured into its heart for the announced and unauthorised march to Parliament House.

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PROPOSED OUTLINE OF THE PARLIAMENT OF INDIA (SECURITY, SANCTITY AND PROTECTION) ACT, 2026

Background and Context

The security of democratic institutions has undergone a profound transformation over the past two decades. Historically, threats to legislatures were primarily conceived in terms of physical violence, terrorism or unauthorised entry into parliamentary premises. Today, however, democratic institutions confront a far broader and more sophisticated spectrum of risks. The emergence of hybrid warfare, cyber operations, artificial intelligence-enabled misinformation, autonomous technologies, insider threats and coordinated attacks on institutional legitimacy has fundamentally altered the security landscape within which parliaments across the world now operate.

Parliament is not merely a physical structure that houses elected representatives. It is the constitutional expression of popular sovereignty, the forum through which democratic deliberation is institutionalised and the principal mechanism by which governments derive legitimacy and remain accountable to the people. Consequently, attacks on Parliament are rarely directed solely at individuals or infrastructure; they are symbolic assaults on constitutional governance itself. Their objective is often to undermine public confidence, interrupt democratic continuity and challenge the authority of the State.

India's own experience demonstrates this reality with particular clarity. **The terrorist attack on the Parliament of India on 13 December 2001** was among the most serious assaults on the constitutional foundations of the Republic. The objective was not simply to inflict casualties but to strike at the centre of India's democratic governance by targeting the institution that embodies the sovereign will of the people. More than two decades later, **the security breach inside the Lok Sabha on 13 December 2023** highlighted a different but equally significant lesson. Although fundamentally different in nature, the incident demonstrated that vulnerabilities need not arise only from heavily armed terrorist organisations. Individuals exploiting procedural gaps, visitor management systems or insider access can disrupt parliamentary proceedings, generate national insecurity and erode public confidence in institutional preparedness.

Constitutional and Democratic Considerations

It is equally important to recognise that Parliament occupies a unique position within every constitutional democracy as both a legislative institution and a powerful democratic symbol. Throughout India's democratic history, public demonstrations, marches and mass mobilisations have frequently culminated in symbolic calls such as "**Sansad Chalo**" ("March to Parliament"), reflecting the belief that Parliament is the ultimate forum through which the voice of the people should be heard. Such expressions of democratic participation are neither unusual nor undesirable; indeed, they are intrinsic to a vibrant constitutional democracy where citizens seek to engage directly with institutions of representative governance.

However, experience across democratic jurisdictions demonstrates that large public gatherings in the vicinity of national legislatures present unique institutional challenges. While the overwhelming majority of demonstrations remain peaceful, crowd dynamics can change rapidly due to provocation, misinformation, infiltration by violent elements, isolated unlawful acts or unforeseen security contingencies. Incidents in India and abroad have shown that protests initially organised as peaceful democratic expressions may, under exceptional circumstances, escalate into attempts to breach security perimeters, disrupt legislative functioning or cause damage to public institutions. In such situations, the institution that symbolises democratic legitimacy itself becomes vulnerable.

The constitutional response to this challenge cannot be the suppression of democratic dissent, nor can it be the abandonment of institutional security. Rather, it requires a careful reconciliation of two equally significant constitutional imperatives. Article 19(1)(a) guarantees every citizen the freedom of speech and expression, while Article 19(1)(b) guarantees the right to assemble peaceably and without arms. These freedoms form an indispensable foundation of participatory democracy and must remain zealously protected. At the same time, the Constitution expressly recognises under Articles 19(2) and 19(3) that these freedoms are subject to reasonable restrictions in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State and public order. These provisions reflect the constitutional understanding that democratic rights and democratic institutions are mutually reinforcing, and that the protection of one cannot come at the complete expense of the other.

Accordingly, the objective of a comprehensive Parliament Security Act should not be to restrict peaceful protest or diminish democratic participation. Instead, it should seek to ensure that citizens are able to exercise their constitutional rights through safe, accessible and designated democratic spaces while simultaneously protecting Parliament; the constitutional institution that embodies the collective sovereignty of the people - from violence, vandalism, unlawful intrusion or disruption. Safeguarding Parliament is therefore not inconsistent with democratic freedoms; it is an essential condition for ensuring that democratic freedoms continue to be exercised through institutions that remain secure, independent and capable of functioning without intimidation or interruption.

Comparative International Experience and Emerging Security Challenges

International developments reveal that such incidents are no longer isolated occurrences but part of a broader global pattern. *The attack on the United States Capitol on 6 January 2021* demonstrated how rapidly political polarisation, coordinated mobilisation and misinformation can culminate in an assault on the seat of democratic governance. *Parliamentary complexes in countries including Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, Bangladesh and Nepal have similarly experienced security incidents arising from terrorism, political violence, organised unrest or attempts to breach legislative premises.* While the immediate circumstances differ, each incident underscores a common lesson: legislatures have increasingly become strategic targets because they symbolise constitutional authority, democratic legitimacy and national stability.

These incidents collectively indicate that parliamentary security can no longer be understood through the traditional lens of perimeter protection alone. The threat environment has evolved from conventional physical attacks to multidimensional challenges requiring integrated institutional resilience.

Modern threats include coordinated cyber intrusions capable of disrupting parliamentary communications, legislative databases and digital voting systems. They include ransomware attacks targeting critical governmental infrastructure, hostile foreign cyber operations seeking to manipulate legislative processes, artificial intelligence-enabled disinformation campaigns designed to influence parliamentary debate or incite public disorder, and sophisticated social engineering techniques directed at Members of Parliament and parliamentary staff. Equally concerning is the growing availability of commercially accessible drone technologies capable of surveillance, delivery of hazardous materials or disruption of secure government facilities. Advances in autonomous systems, facial recognition technologies, deepfakes and quantum computing continue to redefine the nature of institutional vulnerability.

The distinction between physical and digital security has therefore become increasingly blurred. A cyber attack on parliamentary communication systems, manipulation of official records, interference with secure digital infrastructure or coordinated disruption of emergency response mechanisms may have consequences comparable to those of a physical attack. Likewise, misinformation campaigns targeting legislative institutions can undermine public trust without any physical breach occurring. The protection of Parliament must therefore encompass not only buildings and individuals but also institutional credibility, constitutional continuity and democratic legitimacy.

Need for a Comprehensive Legislative Framework

These developments acquire particular significance for India. As the world's largest democracy, India's Parliament represents one of the most visible democratic institutions globally. It functions not only as the legislative authority of the Union but also as a symbol of constitutional governance, political pluralism and peaceful democratic transition. Its uninterrupted functioning is indispensable for law-making, financial governance, national security oversight, constitutional amendment, emergency decision-making and executive accountability. Any prolonged disruption to Parliament - whether through terrorism, cyber warfare, technological sabotage or coordinated institutional attacks, would have consequences extending far beyond the parliamentary precincts. It would affect governance, public confidence, economic stability and India's international democratic standing.

Globally, democratic resilience is increasingly assessed not only by the robustness of constitutional guarantees but also by the capacity of democratic institutions to anticipate, withstand, respond to and recover from evolving security threats. The effectiveness of parliamentary security today is therefore measured not simply by the number of personnel deployed or the strength of physical barriers, but by the institutional capacity to integrate intelligence, technology, legal accountability, cyber resilience, emergency preparedness and democratic oversight within a coherent governance framework.

This comparative assessment demonstrates that most mature democracies have progressively moved towards statutory, integrated and technologically adaptive parliamentary security systems. These frameworks recognise that protecting Parliament is not solely a policing function; it is an essential constitutional responsibility aimed at preserving democratic continuity. Security arrangements increasingly combine physical protection with cybersecurity, intelligence coordination, crisis management, technological preparedness, business continuity planning and independent parliamentary oversight.

India has already undertaken significant administrative reforms following major security incidents. The deployment of specialised security personnel, technological upgrades and improvements in access control have substantially enhanced the protection of Parliament. Nevertheless, these arrangements continue to operate primarily through executive mechanisms rather than a dedicated statutory framework. In an era characterised by rapidly evolving and increasingly unpredictable threats, the security of Parliament cannot remain dependent solely upon administrative practices. It requires a comprehensive legislative framework capable of institutionalising responsibilities, integrating emerging technologies, establishing accountability mechanisms and ensuring periodic adaptation to future risks.

Ultimately, the security of Parliament is inseparable from the security of Indian democracy itself. Democratic institutions derive their legitimacy from the confidence that citizens place in their

ability to function freely, independently and continuously, even during periods of crisis. Protecting Parliament is therefore not simply about safeguarding elected representatives, parliamentary staff or physical infrastructure. It is about preserving the constitutional continuity of the Republic, protecting the democratic mandate of the people and ensuring that future generations inherit institutions capable of withstanding the evolving challenges of the twenty-first century

Country	Major Incident / Trigger	Nature of the Threat	Statutory / Institutional Basis at the Time	Institutional and Legislative Response	Key Lessons and Measures India Could Adopt
India (2001)	13 December 2001. Five terrorists belonging to Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba breached the Parliament House complex during a live session, entering in a vehicle carrying a forged security sticker.	A coordinated armed terrorist assault. Nine security and support personnel were killed and eighteen injured; all five attackers were also killed at the gates. These facts were later placed on record by the Supreme Court in the appeal arising from the prosecution of the accused.	No dedicated parliamentary security statute existed. Security rested on Delhi Police, the CRPF and the in-house Watch and Ward staff, coordinated only through executive administrative orders.	Parliament enacted the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002; vehicle screening and perimeter access were strengthened; Delhi Police, the CRPF and the Intelligence Bureau were brought into closer coordination; the National Investigation Agency was created in 2008, along with a Multi-Agency Centre for intelligence sharing.	POTA addressed the prosecution of terrorism, not the institutional architecture of Parliament's own security. Because no dedicated statute followed, command remained fragmented across Delhi Police, the CRPF and the Parliament Security Service for the next two decades. This is precisely the gap the proposed Act is designed to close, by placing CISF's mandate, and the Speaker's and Chairman's authority over it, on a single statutory footing.

India (2023)	13 December 2023, the twenty-second anniversary of the 2001 attack. Two individuals dropped from the visitors' gallery into the Lok Sabha chamber during Zero Hour and released coloured smoke canisters; two further individuals did the same outside the complex.	An insider and procedural vulnerability. The visitor pass system, obtained through an MP's sponsorship, was exploited rather than the perimeter being forced. No firearms were used, but the breach occurred during a live sitting and exposed a serious lapse in access control.	No standalone statute existed. The response was driven by a committee constituted by the Ministry of Home Affairs and headed by the Director General of the CRPF, an executive administrative review rather than a legislative process.	The Central Industrial Security Force, a Central Armed Police Force experienced in critical infrastructure and airport style access control, was inducted in phases to replace the Parliament Security Service, Delhi Police and the CRPF's Parliament Duty Group. A contingent of over 3,300 personnel, led by a Deputy Inspector General, now conducts X-ray and hand-held detector screening across both Parliament buildings, and visitor Standard Operating Procedures are under review.	Physical hardening alone is not sufficient. Visitor sponsorship, biometric identity verification and sponsor-MP accountability need statutory backing, not administrative circulars. The CISF's mandate, jurisdiction and command relationship to the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha Secretariats remain undefined in law, which mirrors the fragmentation Canada corrected by statute after 2014, discussed below, and is the gap this Act should close.
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Nepal (2025)	8 to 9 September 2025. Protests led by Generation Z demonstrators, triggered by a sudden government ban on major social media platforms and compounded by long-standing anger over corruption and unemployment, escalated within two days into the burning of the Federal Parliament building in Kathmandu and the resignation of Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli.	A rapidly escalating, largely leaderless mass mobilisation organised online, which overwhelmed police lines and culminated in arson attacks on Parliament and other state buildings. Government and rights-body assessments put the toll at 72 to 77 deaths and more than 2,000 injuries over the unrest, with property damage exceeding Rs 84 billion.	No dedicated parliamentary security statute. Security had rested on ordinary police and, once a curfew was declared, the army, under general public order and emergency powers.	The government fell within a day of the building being set alight. An interim government led by former Chief Justice Sushila Karki was sworn in on 12 September 2025 with a mandate to investigate the killings, repeal the contested cybersecurity and social media restrictions, and hold elections by 5 March 2026; a probe commission was constituted to examine the deaths and the destruction.	Nepal's experience shows how quickly online-organised, initially leaderless mobilisation can outpace a security apparatus built around older assumptions of organised, identifiable protest leadership. For India, this reinforces the case for the draft Act's proposed designated assembly spaces and objective, pre-set reinforcement thresholds, since a purely reactive posture, of the kind Nepal's security forces were left with, cannot be improvised once a protest has already turned toward Parliament.
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Bangladesh (2024)	4 to 5 August 2024. Hundreds of thousands of protesters, part of a broader non-cooperation movement against the government, marched on and occupied the Jatiya Sangsad Bhaban, the national Parliament, in Dhaka. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina resigned and left the country as the occupation unfolded.	A mass civil unrest mobilisation following a prolonged political crisis, culminating in the physical occupation of the legislature itself rather than merely its vicinity. The United Nations Human Rights Office, in a fact-finding report presented in February 2025, found that the security and intelligence services of the former government killed as many as 1,400 people, roughly twelve to thirteen per cent of them children, during the protests between July and August 2024.	No dedicated parliamentary security statute. Security had rested on regular police and, once the crisis deepened, the army, under general emergency powers, was overwhelmed by the scale of the mobilisation.	An interim government was installed after Sheikh Hasina's departure. Inside the occupied Parliament, students organised informally to prevent looting pending the restoration of order, illustrating the temporary but complete absence of formal state security capacity at the site.	Bangladesh represents the most severe possible outcome for any legislature, its outright physical occupation, occurring once political legitimacy itself had collapsed under a security response the United Nations later found to have been disproportionate. No security architecture, however robust, can substitute for the constitutional legitimacy this draft Act's own Background section emphasises. Institutional security design must be paired with, not treated as a substitute for, credible democratic accountability and proportionate use of force, the balance India's own reconciliation of Articles 19(1)(b) and 19(3) is intended to strike.
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Sri Lanka (2022)	9 July 2022. After months of sustained protest against a severe economic crisis, demonstrators overwhelmed security cordons to storm the President's official residence and the Prime Minister's office in Colombo; the Presidential Secretariat had already been blockaded by protesters since April 2022.	An economic-grievance-driven mass mobilisation that escalated gradually, over months, from a peaceful, sustained occupation of public space into a full perimeter breach of the highest offices of state. The Prime Minister's private residence was also set on fire the same evening.	No dedicated legislative security statute. Security was provided by regular police and the military under general public order law.	Security forces retook the Presidential Secretariat by force once a new President assumed office; the Speaker of Parliament announced the President's agreement to resign on 13 July 2022. No structural legislative reform of institutional security followed.	This is close to the mirror image of the German case below: a slow-building, overwhelmingly peaceful mobilisation still eventually overcame static security lines once public grievance reached a tipping point. It reinforces the draft Act's own observation that crowd dynamics can shift even without infiltration or provocation, and that security planning must account for gradual, cumulative escalation over months, not only sudden breaches, a distinction relevant to how India polices prolonged agitations in the vicinity of Parliament.
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United States (2021)	6 January 2021. A mob breached the Capitol perimeter and building during certification of the presidential election result. Five deaths were linked to the day, and over 140 officers were injured.	Coordinated political violence fuelled by misinformation, compounded by intelligence failures and unclear command authority between the United States Capitol Police, the DC National Guard and the Metropolitan Police Department.	The United States Capitol Police already operated, and continues to operate, under a codified federal statute, Title 2 of the United States Code, Chapter 29, tracing to the Act of 31 July 1946, with jurisdiction expanded by the U.S. Capitol Police Jurisdiction Act of 1992. The breach occurred despite, not because of, an absent legal framework.	A bipartisan joint report of the Senate Rules Committee and the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, issued in June 2021, set out twenty-one findings and recommended that the USCP Chief be empowered to request National Guard assistance without prior Capitol Police Board approval. The House Select Committee's Final Report of December 2022 called for reform of the Capitol Police Board and mandatory disclosure of its minutes. Funding for fiscal year 2023 rose by more than twenty per cent, to approximately 734.6 million US dollars, and a new statutory Inspector General was appointed in January 2023 to implement outstanding recommendations.	Codification alone does not guarantee operational readiness. The world's most comprehensively statutory legislative police force still failed because escalation authority was unclear in practice. India's own CISF framework should therefore fix, in the statute itself, exactly who may authorise reinforcement and at what threshold, rather than leaving this to inter-agency practice, as occurred before the 2023 Lok Sabha breach.
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Canada (2014-15)	22 October 2014. Michael Zehaf-Bibeau shot and killed Corporal Nathan Cirillo at the National War Memorial, then entered Centre Block's Hall of Honour armed with a rifle before being shot dead by security personnel.	Lone-actor terrorism that exploited a fragmented security structure: three separate forces, the House of Commons Security Service, the Senate Protective Service and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for the grounds, with no unified command.	Before 2015 there was no unified statute. Following House and Senate resolutions, the Parliament of Canada Act was amended in June 2015 to create the Parliamentary Protective Service under Royal Canadian Mounted Police operational command.	All three forces were amalgamated into the single statutory Parliamentary Protective Service. The Speakers of the House of Commons and the Senate were named the Service's ultimate authority, replacing the previous three-way arrangement.	The fragmentation here directly parallels India's own pre-2023 arrangement of Delhi Police, the CRPF and the Parliament Security Service operating in parallel. The European Parliamentary Research Service records Canada's post-2014 shift from a fragmented to a unified command as a legislative, not merely administrative, step that named the presiding officers as ultimate statutory authority. India's proposed Act should follow this template explicitly, naming the Speaker and the Rajya Sabha Chairman as CISF's statutory ultimate authority over its parliamentary deployment.
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United Kingdom (2017)	22 March 2017. Khalid Masood drove into pedestrians on Westminster Bridge, killing four people, then fatally stabbed Police Constable Keith Palmer at the Carriage Gates before being shot dead eighty-two seconds after the attack began.	A vehicle-ramming attack followed immediately by an edged-weapon assault on an unarmed officer at a known vulnerable access point.	The Parliamentary Security Department, established in 2016, is a non-constabulary in-house body. The United Kingdom has no dedicated PSD statute; the broader constitutional basis for Parliament's control over its own security rests on the uncodified doctrine of exclusive cognisance, recorded authoritatively in Erskine May, Section 6.17. PSD's link to policing power runs through a published Special	The 2018 coroner's inquest found that the gate-rotation system for armed officers had not functioned for years in practice and called for a constant armed presence at every gate to Parliament. Hostile vehicle mitigation infrastructure was subsequently expanded, and risk assessments were made continuous rather than periodic.	A written inter-agency agreement did not by itself guarantee day-to-day operational compliance. Periodic, externally audited verification that agreed protocols are actually followed in practice is as important as the protocol's existence, a point directly relevant to any protocol India adopts between the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha Secretariats and the CISF.
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			Services Agreement with the Metropolitan Police's Parliamentary and Diplomatic Protection command.		
Germany (2020-21)	29 August 2020. Roughly four hundred to five hundred people broke away from a thirty-eight-thousand-strong rally against coronavirus restrictions, broke through police barricades and swarmed the steps of the Reichstag building, some waving imperial-era flags, before being pushed back by reinforced police.	A radicalised splinter breaking away from an otherwise lawful, permitted demonstration. The assault was symbolic rather than armed, but it was a serious breach of the legislature's perimeter at a building of particular historical resonance for German democracy.	Bundestag security rests on the Bundestag President's constitutional Hausrecht under Article 40(2) of the Basic Law, rather than a dedicated parliamentary security statute. Federal police powers generally, as distinct from the Bundestag's own arrangements, were separately modernised by the 2021 law	The Bundestag's security concept was revised, accreditation and access controls were tightened, and construction of a physical ditch barrier around the Reichstag began in 2025.	A peaceful, permitted assembly can still produce a breakaway splinter that reaches the legislature within minutes. This validates the draft Act's own premise: a statutorily defined protest or assembly zone at a safe remove, combined with objective, pre-set reinforcement triggers, protects both the right to assemble and the institution, which is exactly the reconciliation Articles 19(1)(b) and 19(3) of the Constitution require.

			reforming the legal foundations of the Federal Police.		
Brazil (2023)	8 January 2023. Thousands of supporters of former President Jair Bolsonaro stormed and ransacked the National Congress, the Supreme Federal Court and the Planalto Presidential Palace simultaneously, one week after President Lula's inauguration, alleging electoral fraud.	A socially mobilised, coordinated assault on all three co-located seats of state power, with credible allegations, later investigated, of complicity or dereliction by some security personnel on duty that day.	No dedicated legislative security statute. The constitutional response mechanism used afterward was a mixed Chamber and Senate Parliamentary Inquiry Commission, a standing statutory inquiry tool available to the Brazilian Congress.	Military police reinforced Congress and the Planalto Palace; the Federal District's public security chief was removed; the federal government temporarily intervened in Federal District security; and the Commission's final report, delivered between April and October 2023, recommended findings of criminal responsibility, including for security lapses on the day.	Co-locating the legislature, judiciary and executive on a single plaza multiplies the consequence of any one breach. Brazil's use of a statutory parliamentary inquiry mechanism able to examine security-personnel complicity, not only external attackers, is a model India could adopt for reviewing any future breach, rather than relying solely on an internally appointed Ministry of Home Affairs committee, as occurred in 2023 to 2024.

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IN THE COURT OF **Delhi at New Delhi**

Suit/Appeal No. **W.P. (C) No. of 2026** JURISDICTION OF 201

In re:-

RAJ SINGH Plaintiff(s) or Petitioner(s)
Appellant(s) Complainant(s)

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. Defendant (s)/ Respondent(s) / Accused Know all to whom
these Present shall come that I/we **RAJ SINGH R/O**

The above named **PETITIONER**

do hereby appoint
RAJA CHOUDHARY

(herein after called the advocate/s) to be my / our Advocate in the above – noted case authorize him:-

To act, appear and plead in the above-noted case in this court or in any other court in which the same may be tried or heard and also in the appellate court including High Court subject to payment of fees separately for each court by me/us.

To sign file, verify and present pleadings, appeals cross-objection or petitions for executions review, revision, withdrawal, compromise or other petitions or affidavits or other documents as may be deemed necessary or proper for the prosecution of the said case in all its stages subjects to payment of fees for each stage.

To file and take back documents, to admit and/or deny the documents of opposite party.

To withdraw or compromise the said case or submit to arbitration any differences of disputes that may arise touching or in any manner relating to the said case.

To take execution proceedings on paying separate fee.

To deposit, draw and receive money, cheques, cash and grant receipts hereof and to do all other acts and things which may be necessary to be done for the progress and in the course of the prosecution on the said case.

To appoint and instruct any other Legal Practitioner authorizing him to exercise the power and authority hereby conferred upon the Advocate whenever he may think fit to do so and to sign the power of attorney on our behalf.

And I/we undersigned to hereby agree to ratify and confirm all acts done by the Advocate or his substitute in the matter as my/our own acts, as if done by me/us to all intents and purpose.

And I/we undertake that I/We or my/our duly authorized agent would appear in court on all hearings and will inform the Advocate for appearance when the case is called.

And I/We undersigned do hereby agree not to hold the advocate or his substitute responsible for the result of the said case. The adjournment costs whenever ordered by the court shall be of the Advocate which he shall receive and retain for himself.

And I/we undersigned do hereby agree that in the event of the whole or part of the fee agreed by me/us to be paid to the advocate remaining unpaid he shall be entitled to withdraw from the prosecution of the said case until the same is paid up. The fee settle is only for the above case and above Court. I/We hereby agree that once the fee is paid, I /We will not be entitled for the refund of the same in any case whatsoever and if the case prolongs for more than 3 years the original fee shall be paid again by me/us.

IN WITNESS WHERE OF I/We do hereunto set my/our hand to these presents the contents of which have been understood by me/us on this **27th** Day of **July** 2026 Accepted subject to the terms of the fees.

Advocate

Client

Client

I Identify the Signature/Thumb Impression of Below Mentioned Person,

Signed in My Presence. The Client,

RAJA CHOUDHARY, LL.M
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